Johnson, Peters, Paul and Blumenthal release bipartisan report examining U.S. Secret Service security failures and assassination attempt on Former President Trump – WisPolitics

WASHINGTON – On Wednesday, U.S. Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), Ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, along with U.S. Senators Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Chairman and Ranking Member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, released a bipartisan interim report on the U.S. Secret Service’s (USSS) security planning, communications and coordination failures that contributed to the July 13 assassination attempt on former President Donald. J. Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania. The interim report includes key findings and recommendations to address those failures and ensure the Secret Service can effectively carry out its protective mission.  

“Shortly after the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on former President Trump in Butler, PA, I released preliminary findings detailing some of the significant security failures that occurred on that day,” said Ranking Member Johnson. “Today’s interim report expands on those security failures, but the investigation is not complete. Federal agencies like the Secret Service, FBI, and DOJ continue to withhold records that are vital to this Committee’s work. There is still much more information that the public and Congress deserve to know. Going forward, this Committee must be prepared to use compulsory process to ensure that the American people have a complete and thorough understanding of the security failures that resulted in the multiple attempts on former President Trump’s life.” 

“From planning missteps, to the siloed and flawed communication to the lack of effective coordination between law enforcement, to the breakdowns in technology, the Secret Service’s failures that allowed an assassination attempt on former President Trump at his July 13 rally were shocking, unacceptable, and preventable – and they led to tragic consequences,” said Chairman Peters. “Moving forward, our bipartisan interim report makes recommendations for needed reforms to address these serious failures, provide accountability and transparency for the American people, and ensure that the Secret Service has the tools and resources they need to prevent another disaster like this from happening.”  

“Our initial findings clearly show a series of multiple failures of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and an inexcusable dereliction of duty,” said Ranking Member Paul. “Not only did USSS fail to ensure the AGR roof was adequately covered, they were also aware of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder for at least 27 minutes and did not delay proceedings or remove former President Trump from the stage, even after being informed that the suspicious individual was on the roof of the AGR building. Someone needs to be held accountable for these egregious failures by the USSS, and despite USSS, DHS, FBI, ATF, and other federal agencies’ continued obstruction of our bipartisan investigation, I will continue to push for answers and accountability.” 

“What happened on July 13 was an accumulation of errors that produced a perfect storm of stunning failure,” said Chairman Blumenthal. “It was a tragedy and completely preventable from the outset. There was both a failure to provide resources – like a working radio, drone detection system, or counter surveillance team – and lack of an effective chain of command. Looking forward, we need structural reform in the agency itself. The Secret Service is filled with dedicated and skilled men and women who serve our country at great risk to themselves and personal sacrifice, and they deserve better leadership. Today’s report is only an interim step, and I look forward to our continuing pursuit of evidence to help understand what went so catastrophically wrong and how we can prevent an event like this from ever happening again.” 

READ THE INTERIM REPORT:“Examination of U.S. Secret Service Planning and Security Failures Related to the July 13, 2024 Assassination Attempt” 

The interim report’s key findings of failures include: 

1. USSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally: USSS personnel responsible for planning in advance of the July 13 rally denied that they were individually responsible for any planning or security failures and deflected blame. USSS Advance Leads told the Committee that planning and security decisions were made jointly, with no specific individual responsible for approval.  
      
2. USSS failed to ensure the AGR Building was effectively covered: USSS identified the AGR building as a concern due to the line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, but did not take steps to ensure sufficient security measures were in place. USSS knew that local snipers planned to set up inside the AGR building and USSS did not express objections or concerns about that placement. USSS personnel, including the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, did not enter the AGR building or go on the roof prior to the shooting. One USSS counter sniper team, whose responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats, had an obstructed view of the AGR roof.   

3. USSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement: USSS did not give state or local partners any specific instructions for covering the AGR building, including the positioning of local snipers. USSS did not adequately consider state and local law enforcement operational plans. Communications at the July 13 rally were siloed and USSS did not ensure it could share information with local law enforcement partners in real time.   

4. USSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security: USSS denied specific requests for additional Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems capabilities and a Counter Assault Team liaison. A USSS Counter Surveillance Unit – which could have helped patrol the outer perimeter that included the AGR building – was not requested by USSS Advance Leads.    

5. USSS failed to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump: At approximately 5:44 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed. Approximately two minutes before shots were fired, the USSS Security Room, located on the rally grounds, was told that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR building. Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn.   

6. USSS’s counter drone system experienced technical problems that left it inoperable for hours: With no backup system, the USSS agent responsible for overseeing the C-UAS capabilities at the July 13 rally called a toll-free 888 tech support hotline “to start troubleshooting with the company,” which took several hours.  That agent had only three months of experience working with that equipment and lacked knowledge about it.   

7. Several USSS officials reported experiencing technical problems with their radios at the rally, and told the Committee such problems are common for USSS: A USSS Hercules 1 counter sniper was offered a local radio on July 13 but said he did not have time to pick it up because he was occupied fixing technical problems with his USSS radio.  In addition, at the Pittsburgh airport before the motorcade left for the rally, the USSS Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh field office gave the Lead Agent his radio because the Lead Agent’s radio was not working.   

The interim report’s key recommendations include: 

1. Planning and Coordination: Congress should require USSS to identify defined roles and responsibilities for USSS personnel responsible for advance planning of any protective event. For all protective events, USSS should improve coordination and specify roles and responsibilities between and among federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. USSS policies and protocols should require advance planning leads to request and review state and local operational plans in advance of any protective event to ensure a shared understanding of security responsibilities and vulnerabilities as well as other critical planning and security components.  

2. Responsibility: In advance of each protective event, USSS should designate a single individual responsible for approving all plans, including the responsibility for approving security perimeters.  

3. Communications:  DHS and USSS should ensure communications plans between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and first responders are properly executed and should ensure records retention capabilities. Congress should require that USSS record its radio transmissions at all protective events. Congress should require DHS and USSS to evaluate the steps it needs to take to ensure communications plans with state and local partners are fully executed when conducting law enforcement and/or first response activities at a given location.  Congress should require that DHS and USSS report to Congress any steps taken to remedy past failures to execute communications plans and to ensure compliance with those plans in the future.   

4. Intelligence: USSS should consider sending additional assets, including counter snipers, to all future outdoor protective events as it evaluates intelligence and threats against protectees. USSS should also ensure that the appropriate agents working protective events are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against protectees.  

5. Resources:  Congress should evaluate USSS budget and resources. Security requirements should be determined depending on various threat levels, ranging from less severe threat environments to the highest level of security at National Special Security Events.  Congress should require that USSS allocate assets and resources based on the threat level, not the position or title of the protectee.